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RECENT CASES
CoMMUNITY PROPERTY-LIFE INSURANE-EFFECT or HUSBAND CHANGING
BENEFiciARY WITHouT WIFE's CONSENT--SCOPE OF STATUTE EXEMPTING WIFE'S
SHARE OF PROCEEDS, Husband was insured in favor of his wife by four life
insurance policies, all the premiums of which had been paid with community funds. He changed the beneficiary clause to read in favor of his executors or administrators. His son was principal beneficiary under his will.
The executor and widow made adverse claims to the proceeds of the poliies. The trial court held that the attempted change of beneficiary of the
jolicies was ineffective and that the widow was entitled to the proceeds
of the insurance contracts. Executor appealed. Held: The husband as manager of the community may change the beneficiary and dispose of his
interest by valid testamentary disposition; that the whole of the proceeds
are, as all other marital assets of the community, first subject to the community debts before distribution according to the laws of community
property. One justice dissented as to the coverage of REM. REV. STAT.
7230-1. In re Towey's Estate, 122 Wash. Dec. 199, 155 P. (2d) 273 (1945).
The instant case is a delineation of the broad language of Occidental Life
InsuranceCo. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P. (2d) 27, 114 A. L. R. 536 (1937).
Therein it was held that an attempted change of beneficiary of a life
insurance policy, the premiums of which were paid out of community
funds, was entirely abortive if not concurred in by both parties of the
community. Other jurisdictions confronted with this problem have held
that the husband as manager of the community has power to make such a
change, but the new beneficiary takes subject to the wife's half interest in
the proceeds as community funds. See, e.g., In re Castagnola's Estate, 68
Cal. App. 732, 230 Pac. 188 (1924); Berry v. Franklin State Bank and Trust
Co., 186 La. 623, 173 So. 126 (1937). The Washington court in the Power's
case held such would be incompatible with the settled Washington concept
as enunciated in Marston v. Rue, 92 Wash. 129, 159 Pac. 111 (1916). Taking
the decision in the Power's case at its face value it would seem that the
husband could not change the beneficiary of such a policy without the
consent of the wife and the respondent so contended. See also, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Skov, 51 F. Supp. (E. D. Or. 1943); comment, 13
WAsH L. REv.321, wherein it is implied in the writer's concluding sentence
that the husband may not bequeath his share of the proceeds as community
property. The broad language of the Power's case is somewhat misleading
when applied to the facts of the Towey case, and under these facts- the
major premise of the Powers case is inapplicable; that is, there is here no
attempt by the husband to make a gift of community property.
The result reached in the principal case seemed to be anticipated by the
late Prof. Luccock in his exhaustive paper on this subject appearing in
16 WAsL L. REv. 187 wherein it is stated, "Where the estate of the insured
is designated as beneficiary there is no problem, such designation does not
affect the community interest in the policy." The statement is not conclusive that he expected the instant result, for it merely covers the case
wherein the estate is named beneficiary, no mention being made of the
problem of change; however, from the tenor of his analysis of the Washington concepts concerning the ability of either spouse to effect a gift it
is submitted that the instant result was anticipated. Luccock also suggested
the language of the Powers case did not preclude the possibility that the
mere designation of a spouse as beneficiary is sufficient to constitute a gift
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of the insured's community interest in the policy. His recognition of the
problems of distribution to children and that of estate and inheritance taxes
in the event the non-insured spouse should die first if such a theory was
adopted, as in some jurisdictions, e.g., In re Miller's Estate, 23 Cal. App.
(2d) 16, 71 P. (2d) 117 (1937), perhaps was heeded by the court in the
Towey case, for there such a possibility is dispelled.
REmL REv. STAT. § 7230-1 allows exemptions of proceeds from the claims
of creditors, in the absence of fraud, when a life insurance policy is "in
favor" of a married woman. The dissenting justice's interpretation that
the wife's community interest in the proceeds should inure to her separate benefit free from the claim of creditors, evidences an even new extreme
liberal position beyond that liberality accorded her in Washington which
is now far beyond that of the other community property jurisdictions. The
statute neither expressly prohibits nor demands such a result. Being a
derrogation from the former status of the creditor in regards to the proceeds of insurance policies it seems that the normal rule of strict statutory
construction against change when confronted with ambiguity should be
applied. See Allen v. Griffin, 132 Wash. 466, 232 Pac. 363 (1925); Crawford,
Statutory Construction, § 248. It is a noble motive to protect the wife, and
such a result is reached in at least one jurisdiction wherein a series of
cases have consistently construed a similar statute liberally. See In re Will
of Grilk, 210 Iowa 587, 231 N. W. 327 (1930). It is submitted that the coverage of the statute allowed by the instant case is correct in the absence of
any vested separate property interest of the surviving spouse in the policy.
W. C. K.
EviDEmcE--Iv EAcm= BY STATEmENTS SHOWING BIAs-LAYING FOUNDATIoN-At a criminal trial B testified for the state. On cross-examination B

was asked if he had not made a statement to W in Seattle that he "had
had some difficulty with D over dice, and that he was going to get D one of
these days." B denied this statement. D then called W and asked him if
B had not in January or February of 1942 made a statement to him concerning what he was going to do to D because of a purported dice game.
Objection by prosecutor was sustained. On appeal from judgment of convictions it was held: that a '"oundation must be laid" for the introduction
of a prior statement showing bias and that, in this case, the foundation
was insufficient. State v. Harmon, 121 Wash. Dec. 562, 152 P. (2d) 314 (1944).
This jurisdiction has consistently followed the general rule requiring
that a "foundation be laid" for impeachment based upon a prior inconsistent statement. State v. Constantine, 48 Wash. 218, 93 Pac. 317 (1908);
Scandinavian American Bank v. Long, 75 Wash. 270, 134 Pac. 913 (1913);
State v. Gleason, 116 Wash. 548, 199 Pac. 739 (1921); State v. Green, 158
Wash. 574, 581, 291 Pac. 728 (1930). A proper foundation is laid when the
witness's attention is called to the contradictory statement, and to the time
and place where it was made, the circumstances surrounding its making,
and is given an opportunity to deny, admit, or explain it. State v. Constantine, supra. But whether a foundation need be laid before the introduction of a prior statement showing bias is a question on which the courts
have split. The majority refuse admission to prior statements showing
bias unless a foundation has first been laid. Cases collected in Note (1922)
16 A. L. R. 984; 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) § 953 n. 1. Also Note
(1929) 39 YALE L. J.129. A strong minority holds contrariwise. See Note
(1922) 16 A. L. R. 991; 3 Wigmore § 953; and particuarly Kidd v. People, 97
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Colo. 380, 51 P. (2d) 1020 (1935). Objections to the majority rule and its
arbitrary and inflexible application are forcefully stated in 3 Wigmore §
1027. See also Note (1927) 13 IowA L. REV. 482.
While there are many prior decisions in this jurisdiction requiring the
laying of a foundation before a witness can be impeached by showing prior
inconsistent statements (see Washington cases cited supra), the question
whether a foundation need be laid prior to showing bias by former statements was apparently of first impression in this jurisdiction. In holding
that the foundation must be laid in either event the court cited only Underhill's Criminal Evidence (4th ed. 1935) p. 908.
The authoritativeness of the holding upon the point discussed may be
somewhat weakened by the circumstance that the court also held that on
other grounds (irrelevancy and no seasonable offer of proof) the exclusion
of the evidence was not reversible error.
K. B. K.
TENANCY

AT Wi--TENANT OR EPLOYEE-CONTRACT FOR WATCHMAN IN

GRAVEL PIT AS CREATING LANDLORD-TENANT OR EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONsmp. Plaintiff was employed as watchman and caretaker of a gravel pit
owned and operated by the City of Seattle, said employment to last until
the defendant city should have just cause to discharge plaintiff or until
the city should cease to own and use the pit. Plaintiff seeks an injunction
restraining defendants from ejecting him from the property in that there
was no just cause for the termination of the employment, or in the alternative for $300, which sum plaintiff had expended in improving the house
he occupied on the premises. Held: Dismissal affirmed. Plaintiff was tenant at will of defendant city, not an employee, and the tenancy: could be
terminated on reasonable notice which was given. Najeuwtz v. The City of
Seattle, 21 Wn. (2d) 656, 152 P. (2d) 722 (1944).
The specific tenancy created was that of a tenancy at will. An earlier
Washington case of Morris v. Healy Lumber Co., 46 Wash. 686, 91 Pac. 186
(1907) contained dicta to the effect that the four tenancies created- by
statute were exclusive and hence there was .no tenancy at will in Washington. In-the recent case the court said, "For in construing an agreement
creating a tenancy which does not fall within any of the four categories of
tenancies defined by statute, we think the rights of the parties can be
properly determined only by report to the rules of common law."
Tenancy at will is defined as an estate which is terminable at the will
of the transferor and also at the will of the transferee and which" has no
other designated period of duration. 1 Tiffany, Real Property (3rd ed. 1939)
§ 155 and Restatement of Property (1936) § 21. The question as to whether
the relationship created is that of landlord and tenant or employer and employee is generally determined by the character of the holding under the
contract. 32 Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant, § 9-10. As a general rule
where the employee occupies premises of his employer for the purpose of
better carrying out the employer's business, and without payment of rent,
these circumstances are usually decisive that the relationship of landlord
and tenant does not exist between the parties. 3 Thompson on Real Property (perm. ed. 1940) 9 1073. Ordinarily a caretaker in charge of the
premises is not a tenant. Presby v. Benjamin, 169 N. Y. 377, 62 N. E. 430
(1902). A servant or bailiff, or any person occupying land or buildings
in a merely ministerial character does not acquire possession. 1 Tiffany,
Landlord and Tenant 9. Where the plaintiff didn't have possession as such,
there was no tenancy at will created. Cook v.. Kienk, 142 Cal. 416, 76 Pac.
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57 (1904). It has been held that continuance in possession after the termination of the employment is by the mere sufferance of the master, and
creates a tenancy at sufferance. This result would seem to be precluded
by the statutory definition in Washington in Rav. REv. STAT. § 10621, but it
seems clear that at common law a tenancy at sufferance would be created.
J. D.
MuxiciPAL. CoaRoRnoNs-STREms-CLOsURE As WAR I-x sua-EFFrrc As
To STATUTORY RULES oF CoNDUcT. A street within the defendant's corporate
limits was restricted in its use by the army as a war security measure.
Armed guards were placed at each end of the prescribed area allowing only
defendant's busses and people with the proper passes to enter. Within this
area, while walking along the Tight side of the street, the plaintiff was
injured by one of the defendant's busses. REm. REv. STAT. (vol. 7a, 1937) §
6360-101 states that on a public highway having no sidewalks pedestrians
must walk on the left side of the pavement. Defendant maintains that
plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law thus denying to her
recovery for damages. Held: For plaintiff. State traffic code does not apply
to an area restricted in its use by the United States Army. Bennett v. Seattle, 122 Wash. Dec. 423, 156 P. (2d) 685 (1945).
The fact that the United States through the army assumed control of an
area would not ipso facto suspend state and local laws. Even where military government has been proclaimed local laws remain in force except
insofar as they are suspended or superseded by regulations ordained by the
military authority. 67 C. J. 422, § 177; Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 20 How. 176
(1858). When the United States, upon receiving the state's consent, has
assumed exclusive jurisdiction, the state and local laws then in existence
remain in force insofar as they are not inconsistent with federal law. James
Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U. S. 94 (1940); Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. V.
McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542 (1885); State v. Rainier Park Co., Inc., 192 Wash. 592,
74 P.(2d) 464 (1937). On the general proposition that the state legislature
must cede 'the state's jurisdiction before the United States can acquire exclusive jurisdiction see Ryan v. State, 302 U. S. 186 (1937). For a recent discussion of the jurisdiction problem see Penn Dairies v. Pennsylvania, 318
U. S. 261 (1943); Pacific Coast Dairy v. California, 318 U. S. 285 (1943).
But granting that the army did not by the fact of its control suspend
state laws, did the restrictions so limit the use of the thoroughfare that it
no longer could be classed as a public highway? R M. REV. STAT. (vol. 7a,
1937) § 6360-1 (qq) defines a public highway as one which the public may
use "as a matter of right." The court held that the street is not public
within the definition of the statute. In reaching that result, however, the
court states that the public easement has not been dissolved by the army
control. This statement coupled with the fact that the use of the street has
not changed tends toward the conclusion that the state law should apply.
Also, it is the general policy of the state to regulate traffic as a matter of public safety. This policy should be given considerable weight especially in light
of the fact that no traffic regulations are effective in this very congested
area if those of the state do not apply. On the other hand, the fact that
every member of the public could not use the street as a "matter of right!'
would not seem to be controlling. No "rights" are completely unrestricted.
The public cannot use the toll bridges of the state as a "matter of right"the toll must be paid first! No one would deny that the state traffic laws
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apply to the roadways on those structures. The wartime restrictions on
air travel or on telephone service deny their use to a portion of the public
as a Imatter of right." No one would suggest that the "public" character
of those businesses is lost by reason of these temporary restrictions.
This is a case of first impression. The implications of this decision
could be great. Could not state regulations relative to health and safety
and even the workmen's compensation law be swept aside in industrial
establishments subject to similar war-time restrictions if reasoning analaW. A. Z.
gous to that in this case were employed?
rAoN--Amssm rY OF PAROL EVIDENCE. In 1939 deCoN=rAcT-IrTsa
fendant sold three retail stores to plaintiffs under a written contract providing for the payment of the balance of the purchase price in installments
-the last installment maturing in July, 1944. In the contract defendant
agreed to render buying service for plaintiffs so that plaintiffs could get
their merchandise at from five to seven per cent less than wholesalers'
prices. The services were to be rendered without charge until January 1,
1940, after which defendant was to continue to render such service subject
to the payment of a fee in an amount to be mutually agreed upon.
The service was rendered until February, 1942, when defendant refused
to continue. Plaintiffs brought action for damages for breach of contract.
Defendant contended at the trial that after January 1, 1940, he could cancel
the service at will because the contract specified no time limit for the
continuance of the services. Over defendant's objection the trial court
allowed plaintiffs to introduce evidence that defendant, after signing, but
prior to the delivery of the contract, orally promised that the services
would continued as long as plaintiffs owned defendant money. Jury
rendered a verdict for plaintiffs. Judgment was entered upon the verdict.
Defendant appealed, one of defendant's assignments of error being that
the trial court bad allowed parol evidence to come in to alter a written
instrument. Judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Supreme
Court en bane. Held: that the evidence was admissible. Three judges dissented. Randall v. Tradewefl Stores, Inc., 21 Wn.(2d) 742, 153 P.(2d) 286
(1944).
The Supreme Court rendered four different opinions: Robinson, J.-"That
it is the intent of the contract [as written] that the seller should be bound
to render the buying service after January 1, 1940, is unmistakable." The
trial court might have held as a matter of law that the parties intended
that the services were to continue for the "remaining life of the contract;"
nevertheless, the trial court was justified in admitting oral evidence consistent with this implication of the contract "in order that the intention of
their contract be found and its ambiguity resolved." Blake, Jeffers and
Mallary, JJ., concur. Steinert, J. (concurring in result)--"Since the contract here involved did not provide the length of time of its continuance or
when it should terminate, a reasonable time is to be implied." In determining what is a reasonable time, evidence of all the surrounding facts
and circumstances, "including the conversation and parol agreements between the parties," is admissible. The instructions not being before the
court, it is to be presumed that the jury was instructed in accordance with
these principles. Grady, J., concurs with Steinert, J. Simpson, C. J. (dissenting)-No time having been fixed, a reasonable time is implied. However, the introduction of parol evidence that a specific time limit was
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agreed upon contradicts and varies the effect of the contract as written
and thus violates the parol evidence rule. It was his view, also, that "under
the authority of the majority opinion, it is clear that hereafter every contract construed in this state, whether written or not, will ultimately rest in
parol." Beals, J., concurs with Simpson, C. J. Millard, J. (also dissenting)Subscribed to the dissent of Chief Justice Simpson and emphasized the
desirability of adhering to the rule of prior cases: "With us the rule of
legal stability is a myth. Each time we disregard the rule of stare decisis, to
which I would not yield if by so doing error were perpetuated and principle sacrificed, we advise the bar that it must be content to continue to
practice the legal profession in terms of surmise. It may be that I am too
insistent in urging respect for the principle of stare decisis and that I display consummate ignorance in continually kicking against the pricks. See
Acts 9:5. However, I would not like to appear, as John Bunyan has it
'much tumbled up and down in my mind,' divided between my wish
to help a poor litigant and the duty of maintaining legal stability."
To the writer it does not appear that the majority's decision is necessarily
inconsistent with the prior Washington cases cited in the dissenting
opinions. The contract was not exclusively for services, but for the sale
of property with an incidental agreement to render services; the life of
the sale contract was specifically fixed; it is a fair implication that the
services were to continue during the life of the sale contract, and the parol
evidence merely confirmed this implication.
E. D. L.

